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I. INTRODUCTION
Derivatives are financial instruments whose value depends on
the value of an underlying asset price, reference rate, or index.'
* John D. Finnerty is a Principal of Analysis Group/Economics based in New
York. His areas of specialization include valuation, calculation of damages, and
litigation support for matters involving derivative instruments, securities class
actions, securities valuation, securities fraud, solvency analysis, and closely held
corporation valuation disputes. He has testified as an expert in valuation, as well
as other financial matters, in federal and state court, and in arbitration and
mediation proceedings. He has also testified as an expert in Bankruptcy Court
concerning the fairness of proposed plans of reorganization.
Mr. Finnerty has spent his career in the financial services industry having
previously worked for Morgan Stanley, Lazard Fr~res, McFarland Dewey,
Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin, and most recently, as a Partner in the
PricewaterhouseCoopers Financial Advisory Services Group's Dispute Analysis
& Investigations practice. He is a nationally recognized expert in securities
valuation and has published extensively in that area, including nine books and
more than sixty articles and professional papers. His most recent books include
CORPORATE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT and PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT, published by Prentice Hall, and DEBT MANAGEMENT, published
by the Oxford University Press in fall 2001.
For the past fourteen years, Mr. Finnerty has also served as Professor of Finance
at Fordham University. Mr. Finnerty received his Ph.D. in Operations Research
from the Naval Postgraduate School, an M.A. in Economics from Cambridge
University, which he attended as a Marshall Scholar, and a B.A. in Mathematics
from Williams College. Mr. Finnerty is also an Editor of FMA Online, a former
Editor of Financial Management, and a member of the editorial boards of three
other financial publications.
** Mark S. Brown has his M.B.A. from Cornell University, LL.B. from the
University of Windsor, and his Honors B.A. in Economics and Philosophy from
the University of Toronto. Mr. Brown was admitted to the Ontario Bar in
February 1995 and worked as a solo practitioner in Toronto until 1997, with a
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The primary purpose behind investing in derivative instruments is
to enable individual or corporate investors to either increase their
exposure to certain specified risks in the hope that they will earn
returns more than adequate to compensate them for bearing these
added risks (referred to as speculation) or reduce their exposure to
specific financial risks by transferring these risks to other parties
who are willing to bear them at lower cost (referred to as hedging).
Due to a combination of market volatility and lack of
sophistication, many derivatives users have failed to realize the
financial outcomes they were seeking, and in some cases investors
have suffered large losses and initiated litigation seeking to recover
these losses.
This Article provides an overview of federal derivatives
lawsuits filed and regulatory enforcement actions taken in the
United States between 1994 and 2000. It summarizes the types and
numbers of cases initiated and illustrates the trends that have
become apparent. Also, a number of specific cases are discussed to
highlight some of the important issues pertaining to derivatives
litigation.
II. DERIVATIVES AND MARKET VOLATILITY
Derivatives litigation tends to increase following periods of
heightened market volatility. This is because market volatility
leads to greater movements in commodity prices, mortgage rates
and interest rates, which in turn lead to greater changes in the
value of derivative instruments. The largest number of derivatives
cases was filed in 1994, following a period in which interest rates
rose suddenly and dramatically.2
focus on litigation. He has been with PricewaterhouseCoopers since 1999 and
was admitted to the New York Bar in July 2000.
1. JOHN FINNERTY, THE PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS CREDIT
DERIVATIVES PRIMER 3 (1999), available at
http://www.creditex.com/creditex/content/pdf/pwcCredDeri.pdf
(last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
2. The interest rate for the 10-year Treasury note increased from 5.6% in
January 1994 to 7.9% in November 1994. See BLOOMBERG Bus. NEWS, Bonds
Fall Again to Yield 8.03% on Surging Consumer Confidence, INV. Bus. DAILY,
Nov. 30, 1994, at B10 (stating that the ten-year treasury note was yielding 7.93%);
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Investors who fail to appreciate the risks involved in using
derivatives are often quick to seek legal redress against the
financial institutions and brokerage houses that sold them.
Common causes of action include securities fraud,3 negligent
misrepresentation,4 and breach of fiduciary duty! Consequently,
derivatives dealers and their counsel can learn valuable lessons
concerning the forms of behavior that will expose them to
significant legal risks by reviewing the cases that have been filed
and the judicial decisions that have been rendered.
III. OVERVIEW OF CASES FILED BETWEEN 1994 AND 2000
Information was gathered concerning federal court actions,
federal enforcement actions, and to the extent it could be found,
information concerning state-filed actions and arbitration
proceedings in which at least one of the main allegations concerned
futures or forward contracts, options, collateralized mortgage
obligations ("CMOs"), inverse floaters, repurchase obligations
(repos), structured notes, swaps, or other derivative instruments.
Futures, forwards, options, and swaps are the basic derivative
instrument building blocks." These instruments are often
combined in various packages to create more complex derivatives.
CMOs, for example, are complex mortgage derivatives; inverse
William Pesek Jr., Lacking Retail Interest, Sullen Markets Fail to Crack Current
Ranges, BOND BUYER, Jan. 28, 1994, at 2 (stating that the ten-year treasury note
was yielding 5.66% in January 1994).
3. Fraud in connection with the sale of securities pursuant to Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See, e.g., Laser Mortgage
Mgmt., Inc. v. Asset Securitization, No. 00-CIV-8100, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13746 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2000).
4. Where the defendants misstate or omit material facts "necessary in order
to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading." 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2000). See, e.g., Laser Mortgage
Mgmt, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13746 (providing an example of a derivatives case
with an allegation of negligent misrepresentation).
5. See, e.g., Amada Co. Ltd. v. Republic N.Y., No. 99-CIV-11602 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Nov. 29, 1999). The specific allegation involved the Defendant allegedly
failing to segregate funds placed in its custody by the Plaintiff. See $123 Million
Suit Pending Grand Jury Action, DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP., MAY 15, 2000, at 3.
6. See CHARLES W. SMITHSON ET AL., MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK (1995).
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floaters are interest-rate derivatives; and structured notes are
packages consisting of conventional notes and derivatives. All
three usually contain interest-rate or currency options.
Repurchase agreements are included in this study because the
repurchase leg of the transaction is very similar to a forward
contract for the underlying bond.
A. Frequency of Litigation and Enforcement Actions
Between January 1994 and December 2000, a total of 367
derivatives-related court cases and enforcement actions were filed
in the United States.7 Federal court actions have decreased
somewhat, from a high of thirty-four cases in 1994 to twenty-four
in 2000. Similarly, the number of federal enforcement actions has
dropped from the steady mid-twenties for the prior three years to
eighteen in 2000. Over the seven-year period, on average, twenty-
five federal court actions and twenty-two enforcement actions were
filed each year. Other cases include state-filed actions and
arbitration cases. The figures in Exhibit 1 probably underestimate
the numbers of cases in this category because such information is
more fragmented than information regarding federal court and
regulatory actions.
Jurisdiction 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total Cases
Federal Court 34 27 32 15 21 22 24 175
Fed.
Enforcement 27 18 14 23 26 28 18 154
Actions
Other 5 11 10 2 2 6 2 38
Total Cases 66 56 56 40 49 56 44 367
Exhibit 1: Total Cases Filed Between 1994 and 2000.
B. Cases by Derivative Instrument Tpe
Futures and forwards have been the most common types of
instruments involved in derivatives litigation since 1994, accounting
for 29% of the cases filed. Options rank second and account for
7. See infra Exhibit 1 p. 134.
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23% of the total cases filed during the period The number of
cases involving CMOs has fallen from a high of twenty-one cases in
1995, just after the spike in interest rates in 1994,' to a figure in the
single digits the past four years."
7%
InC Floaters
9% Structured Note6%
E CMOs
* Fuures andForwards
M In-rs Flootrs
o Repos
12 Optios
•StructuredNotes
0 Swaps
o Other
Futr and Forwards
29%
Exhibit 2: Percentage of Cases According to Type of Derivative Instrument -
1994 through 2000.
& See infra Exhibit 2 p. 135.
9. See infra Exhibit 3 p. 136.
10. See infra Exhibit 4 p. 137.
Swap
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Exhibit 3: Interest Rate for 10 year Treasury Note, 1994 through 2000."
In 2000, options were the derivative instrument most often
involved in newly filed litigation, accounting for nineteen of the
fifty-seven derivative instruments cited in the cases.
C. Credit Derivative Cases
Two of the cases filed in 2000 involve credit default swaps. A
credit default swap functions like a letter of credit, enabling an
investor to insure against an event of default, a bond rating
downgrade, or some other specified credit event.'2 They are
relatively new, and the market for them is expanding rapidly.
These derivative instruments are difficult to value because the
11. See generally, Yahoo Finance, at
http://quote.yahoo.com/qs= ATNX&d=c&t=my&l=on&z=b&q=l (last visited
Jan. 15, 2002) (providing the same general information contained in this table).
12. A credit default swap consists of an upfront payment, or series of
payments, in exchange for the counterparty's obligation to make a payment that
is contingent upon the occurrence of a specified credit event. See FINNERTY,
supra note 1, at 15. It represents a form of credit insurance, which pays off when
the credit event occurs. See id. On the fixed-payment leg of the swap, the buyer
of credit event protection (the insured) agrees to make one or more payments,
which represent insurance premiums. See id. On the contingent-payment leg of
the swap, the seller of credit event protection (the insurer) agrees to make the
specified contingent payment. See id.
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underlying security is often not a traded instrument. 3 Until
recently, standardized documentation was lacking, and many of the
early disputes involving credit derivatives revolved around the
threshold issue of whether a credit event, as defined in the
documentation governing the instrument, had in fact occurred."
Derivative 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Instrument Cases
CMOs" 19 21 14 7 7 3 7 78
Futures and 27 21 21 23 12 30 12 146
Forwards
Inverse Floaters 9 7 12 4 7 0 7 46
Repos 7 4 13 5 4 0 2 35
Options 13 19 13 10 11 25 19 110
Structured Notes 3 1 7 4 5 5 2 27
Swaps 11 7 3 1 3 4 4 33
Other 1 0 0 0 5 3 4 13
Total 90 80 83 54 54 70 57 48816
Exhibit 4: Number of Cases According to Type of Derivative Instrument - 1994
through 2000.
D. Representative Credit Derivatives Cases
GMO Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston17 is a breach-of-
13. Id. at 41.
14. Examples of credit events include a bond default or a bond rating
downgrade, which triggers a payoff under a credit swap. The event will be
specified in the contract setting out the rights and obligations of each
counterparty to the transaction. Id. at 46, 59.
15. CMOs include interest-only securities (1Os) and principal-only securities
(POs). Dealers can take a portfolio of mortgages and decompose them into two
classes of claims: 1Os that receive all the interest payments and POs that receive
all the principal payments. See ANDREA S. KRAMER, FINANCIAL PRODUCTS:
TAXATION, REGULATION AND DESIGN § 2.1(B)(4) (1991).
16. Individual cases may contain more than one derivative instrument or
underlying item.
17. GMO Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston, No. 00-CIV-3760 (S.D.N.Y.
filed May 18, 2000). The complaint in this case was filed on May 18, 2000, and
the parties agreed to a settlement on March 20, 2001. See Mutual Fund Sues
Credit Suisse First Boston For $4 Million, ANDREWS' BANK & LENDER LIAB.
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contract dispute involving two credit default swaps tied to
Ecuadorian bonds with a notional value of $93.5 million.18 The
swap counterparties were GMO Fund ("GMO"), the buyer, and
Credit Suisse First Boston ("CSFB"), the seller. As long as
Ecuador made the payments due under the reference bonds, GMO
was obligated to pay CSFB a fixed amount calculated on the basis
of the accredited face value of the reference bonds.'9 In the event
Ecuador committed a payment default, GMO would be entitled to
receive a specified credit default payment from CSFB. ° In March
2000, Ecuador defaulted on its payment obligations under the
reference bonds." As the "calculation agent" designated in the
swap confirmations, CSFB was responsible for determining the
market price of the reference bonds at termination and calculating
the amount of the payment due GMO.
The lower the value of the reference bonds at the time of
termination, the greater the payment GMO would receive and vice
versa.' GMO thus desired the lowest valuation of the bonds
LITIG. REP., June 29, 2000, at 4; Two Derivatives Cases Settle in S.D.N.Y.,
ANDREWS' BANK & LENDER LIAB. LITIG. REP., June 1, 2001, at 8.
18. The principal amount, or face value, of a bond is the amount of money
that the bond issuer promises to pay to the bondholder when the bond matures.
See BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 469 (5th ed.
1998). See RICHARD J. TEWELES & EDWARD S. BRADLEY, THE STOCK MARKET
44-46 (7th ed. 1998). The market value of the bond can be lower or higher than
the principal amount, depending on prevailing interest rates, the time to
maturity, and the creditworthiness of the bond issuer. See id. The notional value
of the swap is usually tied to a specific principal amount of the underlying bond.
See generally Charles W. Smithson & CIBC Wood Gundy, A Building Block
Approach to Financial Engineering: An Introduction to Forwards, Futures, Swaps
and Options, MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J., Winter 1987 (providing general definitions
of swaps among other derivatives products). It is only a notional value because
the swap is not a bond contract, and the notional value is used solely to calculate
the amount of any payments due under the swap contract. See id.
19. The reference bonds in this case were bonds issued by the Republic of
Ecuador. See Mutual Fund Sues Credit Suisse First Boston For $4 Million, supra
note 17; Two Derivatives Cases Settle in S.D.N. Y., supra note 17.
20. The amount of this payment was to be based on the market value of the
reference bonds at the time of the default. See Mutual Fund Sues Credit Suisse
First Boston For $4 Million, supra note 17.
21. Id.
22 See id.
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possible whereas CSFB sought the highest. The manner in which
the market price was to be determined, as stipulated by the swap
confirmations, required CSFB to poll five established market
makers for their offer prices for the reference bonds and to use the
average as the value of the reference bonds.' GMO accused CSFB
of falsely inflating the market value of the reference bonds by
manipulating the market makers.24 CSFB denied the allegation and
counterclaimed that GMO improperly pressured the market
makers to quote lower offer prices.'
Aon Financial Products Inc. v. Societe Generale26 is a breach-
of-contract dispute involving two back-to-back credit default swaps
that were intended to shift loan repayment risk as part of the
construction financing for a condominium tower in the
Philippines.' Bear Stearns International ("Bear Steams") loaned
$9.3 million to Ecobel Land, Inc. ("Ecobel"), a Filipino
corporation.' As a condition precedent to the loan, Ecobel was
required to procure a surety bond guaranteed by the Government
of the Philippines and Bear Stearns as obligee.29 The surety bond
was the underlying reference asset upon which Bear Stearns and
Aon Financial Products, Inc. ("Aon") entered into a credit default
swap with the former as the credit default buyer and the latter as
the credit default seller." The credit default swap was designed to
compensate Bear Stearns if Ecobel defaulted and the Philippines
23. GMO Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston, No. 00-CIV-3760 (S.D.N.Y.
filed May 18,2000), at 9.
24. The alleged manipulation included CSFB's initial failure to indicate to
the market makers that there were three bonds in total, "asking for a single offer
price for the entire $93.5 million would produce a higher price - one more
favorable to CSFB and less favourable to the GMO Fund." See id. at 10-11; see
also Mutual Fund Sues Credit Suisse First Boston For $4 Million, supra note 17.
25. Two Derivatives Cases Settle in S.D.N. Y, supra note 17.
26. Aon Financial Products Inc. v. Societe Generale, No. 00-CIV-5863
(S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 8,2000); see also Ursa Minor Ltd. v. Aon Financial Products,
No 00-CIV-2474, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10166 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 2000) (providing an
example of a similar case).
27. See Aon Financial Products, No. 00-CIV-5863, at 4.
2& See id. at 2.
29. See id. at 4.
30. See id. at 3.
139
140 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VII
FINANCIAL LAW
refused to pay under the surety bond.31 Subsequently, Aon hedged
its credit risk exposure under the swap with Bear Stearns by
entering into a credit default swap agreement with Societe
Generale,2 a French banking institution, with the latter as seller.
Ecobel allegedly defaulted on the Bear Stearns loan in March
2000."3 However, a dispute ensued over whether a 'credit event'
had actually occurred. The United States District Court ruled that
a 'credit event', as defined by the original credit default swap
agreement between Aon and Bear Stearns, had indeed occurred
and that Aon was required to pay Bear Steams."'
Nonetheless, Societe Generale has refused to pay Aon under
their credit default swap, arguing that the credit event in their swap
has not occurred. s5 Accordingly, Aon is suing Societe Generale for
$10 million on two counts: indemnification and breach of contract.36
Aon bases the former count on the fact that since both of the credit
swaps it engaged in relied upon the same underlying documents
and security, Societe Generale is obligated to reimburse Aon
under its agreement to indemnify Aon for its credit default swap
obligation to Bear Steams.37 The second count arises from Societe
Generale's denial that a valid 'credit event' occurred.38
The Aon-Societe Generale dispute is one of many disputes
that have developed because of the lack of a standard definition of
'credit event'. Since the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association ("ISDA") developed its standard documentation for
credit default swaps in 1999, including a definition of 'credit event',
the potential for such disputes has diminished.39 However, newly
developed derivatives may be difficult to document properly with
existing standard documentation, which exposes the parties to
31. See id.
32 See id. at 1.
33. See id. at 4.
34. See id. at 7.
35. See id. at 8.
36. See id. at 7-8.
37. See id. at 7.
38. See id. at 8.
39. The ISDA is the global trade association representing leading
participants in the privately negotiated derivatives industry. See ISDA, at
www.isda.org (last visited Jan. 16, 2002).
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documentation risk, which in turn can result in legal disputes over
the meaning of nonstandard contract provisions.
Bond or Treasy Scavety
8%
0 Bond or Treasury SecurityEJCommodity
0 Currency
U Ener
0 Equity Security
0 Interest Rate
M Mortgages
0 Other
Interest Rate
16%
Equity Securit
12/
Exhibit 5: Percentage of Cases According to Underlying Asset Class - 1994
through 2000.
IV. CASES BY UNDERLYING ASSET CLASS
Commodities are the asset class underlying more derivatives
cases than any other asset class involved in derivatives litigation
filed between 1994 and 2000. Commodities accounted for 115
cases (26% of the total), though only nine cases involving
commodities were filed in 2000.' Commodities have frequently
been involved in consumer investment fraud cases." Investment
40. See infra Exhibits 5 & 6, pp. 141-42.
41. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n vs. IBS, 113 F. Supp. 2d
830 (W.D.N.C. June 2000).
F 26%Comdt
142 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VII
FINANCIAL LAW
promoters often claim to have developed highly profitable
proprietary trading strategies structured around commodity
forwards, futures, and options, which often turn out to be nothing
more than Ponzi schemes.4'
Underlying 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Asset Class Cases
Bond or Treasury 7 4 6 2 3 7 6 35
Security
Commodity 21 13 16 16 13 27 9 115
Currency 8 10 7 12 2 6 7 52
Energy 1 5 0 2 0 5 0 13
Equity Security 3 6 5 5 10 12 16 57
Interest Rate 20 11 14 7 10 4 5 71
Mortgages 20 22 20 8 11 3 9 93
Other 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 8
Total 80 71 68 52 51 67 55 444"'
Exhibit 6: Number of Cases According to Underlying Asset Class - 1994
through 2000.
The number of mortgage-related cases has dropped from
approximately twenty per year between 1994 and 1996 to an
average of fewer than eight per year between 1997 and 2000. This
drop can be attributed to interest rates generally declining and
becoming less volatile beginning in 1997 following a period of
highly volatile interest rates that extended from 1994 through
1996. '"
The number of equity-securities-related cases rose from three
in 1994 to sixteen in 2000. This increase in equity derivative
lawsuits is at least partly the result of the increases in online
42 See, e.g., Goldinger, Pairgain Charged Civilly and Criminally in Options
Fraud Actions, ANDREWS' SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP., Nov. 29, 2000, at 4
(discussing federal actions against S. Jay Goldinger, an investment adviser who
allegedly used a Ponzi-like system to commingle funds and engage in a "massive
securities-futures trading misallocation scheme."). The action against Goldinger
was ultimately settled. See SEC Settles Action Against Goldinger; Terms Not
Disclosed, ANDREWS' DERIVATIVES LrrIG. REP., Mar. 6,2000, at 6.
43. Individual cases may contain more than one derivative instrument or
underlying item.
44. See supra Exhibit 3 p. 136.
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trading activity and securities trading volumes. The extraordinary
volatility of Internet stocks will likely lead to an increase in
litigation because of the precipitous decline in the prices of these
stocks beginning in March 2000.'
A. Representative Cases
Cromer Finance, Ltd. v. Michael Berger'7 is an example of
litigation stemming from the alleged misrepresentation of the
performance of an Internet stock fund. This case is a securities
class action brought on behalf of investors who purchased
securities of a hedge fund that engaged in short-selling of securities
of Internet and other high-tech companies.' Investors in the fund
lost in excess of $400 million on the hedge fund's short selling,
representing more than 90% of their investment. The fraud was
not detected by the two Big Five auditors, Deloitte & Touche and
Ernst & Young LLP, who attested to the fund's operating results
and financial condition.' In an April 2001 ruling, the claims were
dismissed against some of the larger defendants, including Deloitte
& Touche, but the action was set to proceed against the five
smaller defendants." In July 2001, the remaining defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for failure to
state a claim or to plead fraud with the required specificity. 2
45. The number of on-line traders increased from none in 1994 to six million
in early 2000. See United States General Accounting Office, On-Line Trading
Better Investor Protection Information Needed on Brokers' Web Sites,
GAO/GGD-00-43, May 9, 2000.
46. The NASDAQ Composite Index fell from 4963 on March 24, 2000 to
2470 on December 29, 2000. See Jack Duffy, U.S. Stock Funds Post Steepest Drop
Since 1974: Mutual Funds, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Dec. 21, 2001 (noting that
between the NASDAQ's March 2000 peak and December 2001 the NASDAQ
had plunged 66%).
47. Cromer Fin., Ltd. v. Berger, No. 00-CIV-2284, 2001 US Dist. LEXIS
21440 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2001).
4& See id. at *2-7.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See Cromer Fin., Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 452 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
2001).
52. See Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, No. 00-
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In Log On America, Inc. v. Promethean Asset Management
LLC.,53 the derivative instrument involved was "toxic" or "death
spiral" convertible preferred stock. Log On America, Inc.
("LOA") has alleged that Promethean Asset Management
("Promethean") and several other corporate investors used this
type of convertible stock as part of a short-selling scheme that
drove the company's stock price from $17 to $2.50 a share.5 The
security at issue is preferred stock that can be converted to
common stock based on a floating conversion ratio. 6 The special
feature of the so-called "death spiral" convertible stock is that the
conversion formula is linked to the price of the common stock at
the time of conversion. Therefore, if the stock price falls, the
convertor receives a greater number of shares of common stock. '
The conversion of preferred stock into common stock can thereby
act to dilute the ownership interests of the other shareholders.
Thus, the owner of the convertible preferred stock has a vested
interest in seeing the price of the underlying common stock drop.
In this case, Promethean and other convertible preferred owners
sold short large quantities of common stock at prices lower than
the current market price. 8 The short selling depressed the price of
LOA's stock.59 Promethean responded by claiming that it was
acting within its contractual rights and that the agreement
contemplated and authorized short sale transactions, which
Promethean argues were intended to hedge its equity risk
exposure.'
After LOA's share price had fallen dramatically, LOA refused
CIV-2498, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14744 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2001).
53. Log On America, Inc. v. Promethean Asset Mgmt., No. 00-CIV-6218,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20374 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2001).
54. The "toxic" or "death spiral" convertible stock has a conversion formula
that is linked to the price of the common stock at the time of conversion.
Therefore, the owner of the convertible preferred stock has a vested interest in
seeing the price of the underlying common stock become temporarily depressed,
thereby having a "toxic" effect on the stock price.
55. Log On America, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21440, at *2.
56. Id. at *2-12.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id at *11-12.
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to allow the preferred holders to convert their shares,61 which
triggered their suit for breach of contract. The Court must decide
how to resolve the dispute over what is really a highly flawed and
poorly written contract, which gives the preferred stockholders a
financial incentive to drive down the issuer's stock price to the
detriment of all the issuer's other common stockholders.
In Dorchester Investors v. Peak International Ltd,"2 the plaintiff
alleges that Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities ("DLJ") sold
Trust Enhanced Dividend Securities ("TrENDS")u as a vehicle for
repayment of a $55 million loan the brokerage firm made to the
principal stockholder of British Virgin Islands-based Peak
International, Inc.," and along with Peak, failed to disclose in the
prospectus arrangements that had been put in place allegedly to
facilitate the short sales of the Peak stock.65 The suit alleges that
the defendants failed to disclose that DLJ sold the TrENDS to its
hedge fund customers and loaned them Peak stock, knowing that
the hedge funds would buy the TrENDS and short-sell the
underlying Peak stock." This arbitrage activity allegedly drove
down the price of the Peak common stock, and ultimately, the
TrENDS.67 The suit involves the issue of whether the short selling
went beyond what would be considered normal market-making
activities by a securities dealer.
Other more exotic instruments that were the subject of
litigation in 2000 include Liquid Yield Option Notes ("LYONs"), 6"
61. See id.
62. Dorchester Investors v. Peak Int'l Ltd., 134 F. Supp. 2d 569 (S.D.N.Y.
May 2001).
63. TrENDS are derivative instruments that derive their value from non-
dividend-paying common stock based on the performance of that stock over a set
period of time. See generally, Hedge Fund 'Shorts' Eroded Derivative Stock and
Damaged TrENDS, Suit Says, BANK & LENDER LIABILITY LrrIG. REP., July 21,
1999.
64. Dorchester Investors, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 571-76.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. LYONS are zero-coupon convertible bonds with call and put options. See
generally, Datek-Helpdesk Glossary, at
http://www.datek.com/helpdesk/glossary/bfglosl.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
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bond investments,69 non-deliverable forward currency contracts
and total return swaps linked to Russian notes,' such as GKOs7"
(treasury bills) and OFZs (bonds).7"
V. CASES BY DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENT'S MARKET
Derivatives traded over the counter ("OTC") accounted for
78% of all cases filed between 1994 and 2000.' This situation is
largely due to the fact that the vast majority of derivative
instruments are traded in the OTC market. The OTC market
permits greater customization of derivative instruments, which is
useful to speculators who want to fine-tune their bets, and is also
useful to hedgers who are seeking more cost-effective hedges than
they can get from the options and futures exchanges. OTC trading
is less regulated and tends to involve the more exotic and more
volatile derivative instruments. Instruments traded on the
NASDAQ and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME") were
the next most likely to be the subject of litigation, involving
nineteen and fourteen cases, respectively.
69. See Gallagher v. SEC, No. 00-70141, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25479 (9th
Cir. Nov. 2001).
70. The High Risk Opportunities Fund Ltd. v. Credit Lyonnais, No. 00-Civ-
600229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. dated Jan. 19,2000).
71. GKOs stand for Gosudarstveniye Kralkosrochniye Obligatsii, or short-
term state obligations. See Catherine Belton, Finance Ministry Wants Early GKO
Bonds Issue, ST. PETERSBERG TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, available at
www.sptimesrussia.com/secur/541/news/b_fmans.htm?735curr (last visited Jan.
13, 2002).
72. OFZs stand for Obligatsii Federal'nogo Zaima, or three-year notes. See
Catherine Belton, Finance Ministry Wants Early GKO Bonds Issue, ST.
PETERSBERG TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, available at
www.sptimesrussia.com/secur/541/news/bfinans.htm?735curr (last visited Jan.
13, 2002).
73. This number is derived from 287 out of 367 cases.
74. See infra Exhibit 7 p. 147.
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I Market 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total Cases
AMEX 0
CBOT7 1 2
CME 6  1
MGE77 0
MidAm78  1
NASDAQ 3
NYSE 1
NYBOT79  1
NYMEX 80  1
Non-U.S. Exchange 1
Philadelphia Stock 0
Ex.
Pacific Stock 0
Exchange
OTC
0 1 0 2
5 1 0 3
4 4 0 2
0 2 0 0
0 0 0 0
6 1 7 2
0 0 3 2
0 0 0 3
1 0 1 3
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
55 46 39 31 38 39
ITotal Cases 66 56 56 40 49 56 44 367
Exhibit 7: Number of Cases Filed According to the Derivative Instrument's Market
- 1994 through 2000.
75. Chicago Board of Trade.
76. Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
77. Minneapolis Grain Exchange.
78. MidAmerica Commodity Exchange.
79. New York Board of Trade.
80. New York Mercantile Exchange.
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VI. FEDERAL DERIVATIVES CASES BY CIRCUIT
The Second and Ninth Circuits, representing New York and
California respectively, have handled the vast majority of
derivatives cases filed since 1994.81 The reason for the high number
of cases filed in the Second Circuit is because New York serves as
the financial capital of the United States. The relatively high
number of cases for the Ninth Circuit, especially between 1994 and
1996, may be attributed to the large amount of litigation stemming
from financial problems experienced by Orange County. 2
81. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS DERIVATIVES LITIGATION STUDY 8,
available at http://www.pwcderivatives.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2001).
82. Orange County in California was declared bankrupt in 1994 after
suffering a loss of over $2 billion in derivative transactions. See generally Lyle
Roberts, Suitability Claims under Rule 10b-5: Are Public Entities Sophisticated
Enough to Use Derivatives?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 801 (1996) (discussing the
Orange County bankruptcy in addition to financial problems of other public
entities caused by derivative investments). An example of the litigation resulting
from the Orange County debacle is County of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Inc., in which it was alleged that the defendant assisted the former county
treasurer in entering into illegal, unmatched reverse repurchase obligations on
behalf of Orange County despite having the knowledge that such obligations
were prohibited by law. See County of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 241
B.R. 212, 214-19 (Nov. 10, 1999). The former county treasurer allegedly used
short-term funds borrowed through reverse repurchase agreements to acquire
Swiss franc LIBOR two-year floating rate notes issued by the Student Loan
Marketing Association, or Sallie Mae; this strategy represented a massive gamble
that interest rates would not rise. Id. In February 1994, the market began to turn
sharply against the treasurer's speculative strategy, resulting in Orange County's
financial ruin. Id. Another example of the litigation resulting from the Orange
County bankruptcy is County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., Inc., 245 B.R. 151,
153-54 (Mar. 18, 1999), in which the Court denied McGraw Hill's motion for
summary'judgment on the plaintiff's breach of contract and professional claims,
which alleged the defendant was liable for "providing rating analyses which
wrongly stated that the County's financial condition and ability to repay the debt
were fundamentally sound." Id.; see also infra Exhibit 8 p. 149.
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Federal Circuit 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total Cases
First Circuit 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 4
Second Circuit 10 13 8 5 7 6 18 67
Third Circuit 0 1 4 1 0 2 0 8
Fourth Circuit 2 1 0 1 2 1 2 9
Fifth Circuit 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 5
Sixth Circuit 5 2 1 0 0 0 0 8
Seventh Circuit 2 1 6 3 0 3 0 15
Eighth Circuit 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 6
Ninth Circuit 9 4 9 3 5 4 2 36
Tenth Circuit 2 0 0 0 1 2 0 5
Eleventh Circuit 0 3 2 0 3 2 2 12
Total Cases 34 27 32 15 21 22 24 175
Exhibit 8: Number of Cases Filed According to Federal Circuit - 1994 through
2000.
VII. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Over 70%' of the federal enforcement actions initiated
between 1994 and 2000 were filed by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission ("CFTC"), the regulatory body governing
commodity trading. One hundred and ten cases were filed by the
CFTC compared to thirty-eight by the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") over the 1994 through 2000 period. Only six
cases were brought by the Department of Labor ("DOL") in their
capacity as regulator of public and private retirement plans. The
DOL cases generally involve the allegedly improper use of
83. See infra Exhibit 9 p. 150 (explaining that 110 out of 154 federal
enforcement actions were initiated by the CFTC during the time period
examined).
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derivative instruments by pension fund sponsors or fund managers
in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA").84
Regulatory 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total Cases
Agency
CFTC 18 17 13 14 13 27 8 110
SEC 9 1 1 8 9 1 9 38
DOL 0 0 0 1 4 0 1 6
Total Cases 27 18 14 23 26 28 18 154
Exhibit 9: Number of Cases Filed According to Regulatory Agency - 1994 through
2000.
Total
Allegation 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Cases
Breach of 12 11 9 1 6 11 12 62
Contract
Breach ofFiduc Dt 13 39 8 8 14 40 16 138Fiduciary Duty
Fraud 23 36 20 3 18 21 20 141
Negligence 13 8 8 3 3 14 4 53
Negligent
Misrepresentation 16 34 11 6 26 24 6 123
Securities Fraud 37 33 9 14 25 31 14 163
Total 114 161 65 35 92 141 72 680
Exhibit 1O: Number of Cases Filed According to the Nature of the Allegation -
1994 through 2000.
84. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§
1001-1461 (2000). See, e.g., Alexia M. Herman, Secretary of Labor v. First Capital
Mortgage, No. 00-CIV-0557 (N.D.Ala. filed Mar. 6, 2000); see also infra Exhibit 9
p. 150.
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VIII. CASES BY NATURE OF THE ALLEGATION
The most common allegation cited in cases filed between 1994
and 2000 is securities fraud. Common law fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, and negligent misrepresentation are each alleged in
a third or more of the derivatives cases. Negligence and breach of
contract have been alleged less often.85
Many of the derivatives cases involve multiple allegations.
The percentage of cases alleging securities fraud peaked at 40% in
1997' and has since declined to 19% in 2000.'
Breach of Contract
Securities Fraud 9%
25%
Breach of Fiduciary
Duty
20%
*Breach of Contract
* Breach of Fiduciary Duty
O1 Fraud
O Negligence
Negligent Misrepresentation
*Securities Fraud
Negligent
Misrepresentation Fraud
18% 21%
Negligence
8%
Exhibit 11: Percentage of Cases Filed According to Type of Allegation - 1994
through 2000.
In these cases, plaintiffs generally allege that the defendants
either failed to disclose material information or disclosed
85. See supra Exhibit 10 p. 150; see also infra Exhibit 11 p. 151.
86. See supra Exhibit 10 p. 150. Fourteen out of a total of thirty-five cases
alleged securities fraud in 1997. Id.
87. See id. Fourteen out of a total of seventy-two cases alleged securities
fraud in 2000. Id.
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misleading information about the derivative instrument, the
underlying assets, or the performance of the investments." The
improper disclosure is then alleged to have prevented the plaintiff
from fully understanding the derivative instrument's true risk-
return characteristics or made it impossible for the plaintiff to
value it correctly. 9 In essence, the plaintiffs argue that poor
information caused their losses.
A. Rel resentative Cases
In Laser Mortgage Management, Inc. v. Asset Securitization
Corporation," Laser Capital Mortgage ("Laser") alleged that the
defendant concealed material adverse information regarding a
large loan underlying $19 million in mortgage pass-through
certificates that it purchased from the defendant.9' The securities
were backed by a trust containing a pool of commercial and
multifamily residential mortgages,' one of which was allegedly
"seriously troubled" from the outset.93 Laser bought subordinated
CM094 classes,95 which had the greatest exposure to default risk,
and the default of the large commercial loan rendered Laser's
CMO securities virtually worthless.' Laser argued that the
defendant's material misrepresentations and omissions constituted
securities fraud, which Laser blamed for its investment loss.
In Korea Life Insurance Co. v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of
New York,' the plaintiff alleged that it was defrauded by Morgan
Guaranty on a total return swap." The swap counterparty was
8& See infra Part VIII.A. (providing examples of cases).
89. See, e.g., Laser Mortgage Mgmt. v. Asset Securitization Corp., No. 00-
CIV-810, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13746 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2000).
90. See id. *2-14.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (providing a definition of
CMOs).
95. See Laser Mortgage Mgmt., 2001 US Dist. LEXIS at *2-14.
96. See id.
97. Complaint, Korea Life Ins. Co. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., No.
99-CIV-12175 (S.D.N.Y. dated Dec. 20, 2000).
9& See id. at 6.
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Malaysia-based Morning Glory Investment Inc. ("Morning
Glory"), a trust created by Morgan Guaranty to facilitate a total
return swap for the benefit of Korea Life.99 The payments at issue
were between Morning Glory and Morgan Guaranty based on the
performance of the Japanese yen in relation to the Thai baht and
the U.S. dollar." Korea Life agreed to act as guarantor for
Morning Glory if the Malaysian company was unable to meets its
swap obligations."' Korea Life alleges that Morgan Guaranty
knew that the Thai government was about to devalue the baht
when it entered into the total return swap with Morning Glory and
Korea Life agreed to guarantee the swap counterparty's
obligations.'" According to the complaint Morgan Guaranty
remained silent about the devaluation of the baht because it stood
to gain millions of dollars from the devaluation as the recipient of
Korea Life's guarantee payments." Whether a financial institution
such as Morgan Guaranty could possibly have known about the
devaluation beforehand is likely to be a very contentious issue, but
similar allegations have been made against large financial
institutions in other derivatives cases."
Total return swaps involve the exchange of the total return of an underlying
credit sensitive asset for either some other cash flow which is usually pegged to
LIBOR or for another credit sensitive asset. Under a total return swap, one
party, referred to as the receiver, receives cash flows produced from the
reference asset in exchange for paying to the second counterparty some
reference rate plus or minus a spread. When the swap matures, the second
party pays the receiver any reference asset price appreciation, while the
receiver must pay the second counterparty any reference asset price
depreciation.
Willa E. Gibson, Are Swap Agreements Securities or Futures?: The Inadequacies
of Applying the Traditional Regulatory Approach to OTC Derivatives
Transactions, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 379, 388 (1999).
99. Korea Life Ins. Co, No. 99-CIV-12175, at 6.
100. See id. at 8.
101. See id. at 16.
102- See id. at 11.
103. See id.
104. See, e.g., Slovnaft, A.S. v. Merrill Lynch Int'l, Inc., No. 99-CIV-603760
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. dated Aug. 9, 1999). In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant fraudulently misrepresented that transactions involving derivative-
embedded loans would provide Slovnaft with low-cost, low-risk financing and
that if the price of Brent crude oil fell below the strike price of $15 per barrel,
Slovnaft would be financially protected by a "natural hedge" that would result in
153
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Another case involving allegations of fraud is Sumitomo
Corporation v. The Chase Manhattan Bank."° Sumitomo alleged
that Chase knew about a Sumitomo rogue copper trader, Yasuo
Hamanaka, who was losing millions of dollars on copper
derivatives trades," but loaned him the money disguised as copper
commodity swaps in order to keep the Sumitomo account and gain
the huge profits it stood to make on the swaps transactions."
Sumitomo's amended complaint alleges violations of RICO" and
makes claims for fraud, aiding and abetting fraud, aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with
fiduciary duty, negligence, and rescission of financing agreements
for fraud, lack of authority and lack of consideration."
Breach of fiduciary duty and fraud were the primary causes of
action in Amada Co. Ltd. v. Republic New York Securities Corp. 0
In this case, Japan-based Amada Co. and two subsidiaries allege
that bank holding company Republic New York Securities Corp.
breached its fiduciary duty and committed fraud in the sale of $123
million in investment notes that subsequently lost nearly all of their
value due to derivatives trading." ' The suit also includes
dramatically increased net profits. Id. In fact, any benefit to Slovnaft by reason
of a fall in oil prices would diminish when set against the fall in value of the
products sold by Slovnaft and against the additional interest payments due. Id.
Plaintiffs further alleged that the proposed loans were not suitable for Slovnaft
because embedded within each loan was a high-risk derivative element, which, in
the event that the price of Brent crude oil fell below the strike price, would lead
to very substantially higher interest payments. Id. The plaintiff claimed losses
totalling $75 million. Id.; see also Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of Global
Derivatives Litigation, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 421 (2001) (discussing in detail
Korea Life Insurance and other similar cases).
105. Sumitomo Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 99-CIV-4004, 2000 US
Dist. LEXIS 15707 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1999).
106. See id. at *3-7.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at *7-11.
110. Amada Co. Ltd. v. Republic N.Y. Sec. Corp., No. 99-CIV-11602
(S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 29, 1999); see also N.Y Brokerage Files Motion to Dismiss
$123 Million Fraud Suit, DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP., Mar. 6, 2000, at 3; $123
Million Suit Pending Grand Jury Action, supra note 5.
111. See N.Y Brokerage Files Motion to Dismiss $123 Million Fraud Suit,
supra note 110; $123 Million Suit Pending Grand Jury Action, supra note 5.
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allegations that Republic New York Securities Corp. committed
common law fraud, breached its fiduciary duty, and was unjustly
enriched."'
Cary Oil Co., Inc. v. MG Refining & Marketing, Inc." involves
the alleged breach of long-term oil supply contracts called "flexies"
that the defendant created and sold to the plaintiff in 19931" MG
Refining then sought to cancel the contracts after the CFTC ruled
they were created solely to speculate on the future price of oil,
without any intention on the buyer's part to ever take delivery, and
amounted to illegal off-exchange futures contracts."5 Cary Oil
brought suit alleging breach of contract.
B. Representative Enforcement Actions
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. lBS, 6 four
companies allegedly acted as a "common enterprise" to defraud
investors by selling illegal commodity futures contracts."7 The
CFTC accused the companies' salespeople of touting the
extraordinary profitability of investing in silver futures contracts
without fully explaining the risks inherent in commodity derivative
instruments."' The CFTC alleged that the principals of the
defendant companies also attempted to conceal the companies'
location from investors by maintaining a telephone number, but no
office, in the Bahamas."9 The defendants responded that the
CFTC lacked jurisdiction because the defendants claimed they
were in the business of selling metal (mainly silver), not futures
112. Amada Co. Ltd. v. Republic N.Y. Sec. Corp., No. 99-CIV-11602
(S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 29, 1999); see also N.Y. Brokerage Files Motion to Dismiss
$123 Million Fraud Suit, DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP., Mar. 6, 2000, at 3; $123
Million Suit Pending Grand Jury Action, supra note 5.
113. See Cary Oil Co., Inc. v. MG Refining & Mktg., Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 401
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2000).
114. See id. at 404-05.
115. See id. at 404-08.
116. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm. v. IBS, 113 F. Supp. 2d 830
(W.D.N.C. June 2000).
117. See id at 833-42.
118. See id.
119. See id.
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contracts.'2
In an action brought against Scudder Kemper Investments,2'
the SEC charged Scudder and Gary Paul Johnson, head of the
firm's trading division, with supervisory and record keeping
violations" under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940'" and
Investment Company Act of 1940.24 A Scudder's derivatives
trader was the named defendant in a second action." The alleged
misconduct resulted in losses of more than $16 million and
rendered inaccurate the registrant's books and records. Both cases
settled with Scudder accepting SEC sanctions early in 2000,
including a $250,000 fine, without admitting or denying the
charges.2
In another action brought by the SEC, In re Piper Capital
Management Inc.,'" an administrative law judge ruled that Piper
violated the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933'12
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934129 by failing to disclose the
volatile and interest-rate-sensitive nature of collateralized
mortgage obligations,'30 which made up a large part of the Piper
Jaffray Institutional Government Income Portfolio mutual fund.
On November 30, 2000, Piper was assessed monetary penalties
totalling $2,005,000 for securities laws violations. 13
Federal administrative actions involving derivative
instruments have also been brought by the Department of Labor.
120. See id.
121. See In re Scudder Kemper Inv. Inc. & Gary Paul Johnson, Admin.
Proceeding File No. 3-10121, 1999 SEC LEXIS 2737 (Dec. 22, 1999).
122- See id. at 2.
123. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (2000).
124. Id. § 80a-1-80a-52; see also Scudder, 1999 SEC Lexis 2737, at *4.
125. See Scudder, 1999 SEC Lexis 2737, at *4.
126. See Boston Derivatives Firm Fined $250K for Unauthorized Trades that
Lost $16M, SEC. COMMODITIES LITIG. REP., Jan. 26, 2000, at 5.
127. See In re Piper Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Bruntjen., Admin. Proceeding File
No. 3-9657, 2000 SEC LEXIS 2626 (Nov. 30, 2000).
128. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa et seq. (2000).
129. 15 U.S.C. 88 78a-7811 et seq. (2000).
130. Piper Capital Mgmt., 2000 SEC LEXIS at *2-6.
131. See Judy Mathewson, Piper Capital to Pay $2 MLN for Handling of Fund,
BLOOMBERG NEws, Dec. 1, 2000.
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U.S. Department of Labor v. First Capital Mortgage'32 is an ERISA
case in which the Secretary of Labor accused the defendants of
breaching their fiduciary duty and violating ERISA by investing in
high-risk securities, call options, and warrants on behalf of an
employee benefit plan.33 Defendant Tim A. King, owner and
president of First Capital Mortgage and trustee of the plan,
allegedly breached his fiduciary obligations as plan trustee by
making investments on behalf of the plan that created a high
potential for loss and in fact resulted in significant losses to the
employee benefit plan during 1994 and 1995.'
IX. CONCLUSION
There are approximately fifty derivatives-related cases filed in
the federal courts or initiated by federal regulators each year.
Derivative instruments are complex, and therefore relatively
difficult to understand and value, and their volatility exposes
derivatives users to potentially large losses during periods of
heightened market volatility. When losses occur, lawsuits are
quick to follow, usually alleging various forms of fraud. When
funds suffer losses, fund mangers are exposed to the risk of suits
alleging breach of fiduciary duty for using derivatives improperly,
or in some cases, for using them in the first place.
Securities dealers continue to introduce new derivatives
contracts. Recently introduced instruments include various types
of energy derivatives, weather derivatives, and credit derivatives.
These instruments are designed to reallocate risks among market
participants in order to improve overall market efficiency. But
while the new instruments create new hedging opportunities, they
also entail legal risks because the newer instruments tend to be
more difficult to understand and value than existing instruments
and thus, more prone to occasional large losses. The litigation
record from 1994 through 2000 suggests the possibility that users of
132. Herman v. First Capital Mortgage, No. 00-CIV-0557 (N.D. Ala. filed
Mar. 6, 2000) Herman is named in this action in his position as the Secretary of
Labor. See id.
133. See id. at 6.
134. See id. at 10.
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these new instruments may be unwittingly substituting legal risk for
the financial risks they are trying to shed. Derivative contracts,
especially the newer and more exotic varieties, should bear a
legend: these instruments may be hazardous to your wealth; use at
your own (legal) risk.
